Over the centuries, philosophers like Socrates have tried to describe the ideal social contract and explain how existing social contracts evolved. The philosopher Stuart Rachels suggests that morality is the set of rules that govern behavior that rational people accept, provided that others accept them as well. According to Skyrms, deer hunting “should be a focal point for social contract theory” (2004, 4). The problem with deer hunting is not whether we fight or not, but whether we cooperate and win, or whether everyone goes their own way. There are two nash equilibria in this game: both deer hunting and hare hunting. Alf and Betty, if they find themselves in one of these balances, will stick to it if each consults only its own ranking of options. In a Nash equilibrium, no individual has a reason to overflow. Of course, the contract in which they both hunt deer is a better contract: pareto is superior to the one in which they hunt both hares. However, the balance of the hare is higher in terms of risk because it is a safer bet.
Skyrms argues that iterated game theory cannot simply show that our parties will reach a social contract, but also how they can arrive at the cooperative and mutually beneficial contract. If we`re lucky enough to play repeated games, Skyrms says, we can learn from Hume about “the shadow of the future”: “I learn to do someone else a favor without showing them true kindness; because I foresee that he will reciprocate to my ministry, in anticipation of another of the same kind, and that he will maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me and with others” (Skyrms 2004, 5). Sugden also suggests, in different ways, that repeated interactions, what he calls “experience,” are essential in determining which norms of social interaction actually apply over time (1986). As is well known, Ronald Dworkin objected that a hypothetical (double) agreement cannot bind a real person. For the hypothetical analysis to be meaningful, it must be shown that hypothetical persons in the contract can agree to be bound by a principle that governs social arrangements. Suppose it can be demonstrated that your surrogate mother (a more informed and impartial version of you) would accept a principle. What does this have to do with you? When this hypothetical analysis of the second step is used, it seems that it is suggested that you may be bound by agreements that other people different from you would have made. While it may be reasonable (although it is not necessary) to assume that you could be bound by agreements that you yourself would have entered into if you had had the opportunity to do so, it seems crazy to think that you could be bound by agreements that you would clearly not have entered into, even if you had been asked to. However, this criticism is only decisive if the hypothetical social contract is to evoke your normative power to engage through consent. That your surrogate mother uses her power to bond would not mean that you have used your power.
But here too, the power to engage is not typically invoked in contemporary social contracts: the problem of reasoning is intended to help us move forward on the problem of justification. So the question for hypothetical contemporary contract theories is whether your surrogate`s hypothetical agreement pursues your reasons for accepting social arrangements is a completely different question. In the early days of the cosmic cycle, humanity lived on an immaterial level, dancing to the tunes in a kind of fairytale land where there was no need for food or clothing and no private property, family, government or laws. Then, little by little, the process of cosmic disintegration began its work, and humanity became earthly and felt the need for food and shelter. When people lost their primitive glory, class differences appeared, and they made agreements with each other and accepted the institution of private property and family. With this robbery began murder, adultery and other crimes, and so people met and decided to appoint a man from their background to maintain order, in exchange for a share of the products of their fields and herds. He was called “the Great Chosen One” (Mahasammata), and he received the title of Raja because he pleased the people.  Some societies may place greater value on robust individualism, while other societies place more value on collective action. The articles must clearly and explicitly state the bias, if any, and the respective roles of the two. A social contract will be based to a large extent on values.
Every element of the social contract embedded in a law should first be recorded in the social contract The vision of the dream for humans, as exemplified by the American dream, consists of these elements: artificial intelligence (AI) and robots will have more and more social characteristics in the form of interactions between systems and between robots. Here too, statutes are needed. The other approach to the agreement negotiation models is what we can call a process model. Instead of using different axioms to generate a single rational solution, these theorists rely on a method that produces a specific, but not always unique, result. Process approaches use a mechanism to obtain matches. An example is an auction. There are many types of auctions (e.B. English, Dutch, Vickrey, etc.), each of them having a way to generate offers for certain goods and then decide on a price. Selling at a posted price, as you often see in hypermarkets, is also a kind of bargain, albeit extremely asymmetrical, where the seller offered a “take it or leave it” question. Double bids are more symmetrical and have a clearer link to the original negotiation model. Although auctions are not generally used to solve problems of pure division, there are some examples of auction mechanisms used to solve problems of public goods in interesting ways that guarantee unanimity (Smith 1977). Dworkin also uses some sort of auction mechanism in his work on equality, although he does not develop his approach for a more general application (Dworkin 1981, Heath 2004).
Thus, from Mills` perspective, racism is not just an unfortunate coincidence of Western democratic and political ideals. It is not that we have a political system that has been perfectly designed and, unfortunately, applied imperfectly. One of the reasons we continue to think that the problem of race in the West is relatively superficial, that it does not go all the way, is the impact that the idealized social contract has on our imagination. We continue to believe, according to Mills, in the myths that social contract theory tells us – that everyone is equal, that everyone is treated fairly before the law, that the Founding Fathers campaigned for equality and freedom for all, etc. Thus, one of the real goals of social contract theory is to hide the true political reality from the eyes – some people are granted the rights and freedoms of full-fledged persons, and others are treated as sub-persons. The racial treaty shapes the very structure of our political systems and lays the foundation for the continued racial oppression of non-whites. So we cannot respond by simply including more non-whites in the mix of our political institutions, our representation, etc. Rather, we need to review our policy in general from the point of view of the racial treaty and start from where we are, with full knowledge of how our society has been informed by the systematic exclusion of certain people from the realm of politics and the treaty. This “naturalized” feature of the racial contract, that is, it tells a story about who we really are and what is contained in our history, is better, according to Mills, because it promises to one day allow us to truly live up to the norms and values that are at the center of Western political traditions. .